There is no denying that modern warfare is increasingly fought not only with weapons but with data, software and rapid innovation cycles. Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s ongoing invasion has demonstrated how quickly battlefield technologies can evolve when a state faces an existential threat.

One recent development attracting international attention is a digital incentive system linked to Ukraine’s defence-technology ecosystem. The program called the ‘Army of Drones bonus’ rewards soldiers with e-points if they upload videos proving their drones have hit Russian targets. It has also been integrated into the new online marketplace Brave1 Market and DOT Chain, which will allow troops to convert e-points into new equipment for their units.

The program awards points for different types of kills: 20 points for damaging a tank, 40 points for destroying one, up to 50 points for eliminating a mobile rocket system depending on its calibre, and six points for killing an enemy soldier. Soldiers must upload video footage captured by their drones to the military’s Delta communication and situational awareness system to verify each kill. The system is designed to allocate more equipment to the most effective units and streamline procurement by allowing weapons to be purchased directly from manufacturers, bypassing bureaucratic procedures.

Media coverage has characterised the model as “video-game-like”. From a legal perspective, however, the key question is simply whether such a system operates within the framework of the law of armed conflict (LOAC).

Ukraine’s Right of Self-Defence

Ukraine’s military operations occur within the context of an international armed conflict following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, Ukraine is exercising its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence. The conduct of hostilities is therefore governed by the full body of international humanitarian law (IHL), including:

• • The Geneva Conventions of 1949;

• • Additional Protocol I (1977); and

• • Customary International Humanitarian Law

Distinction and Target Verification

The foundational rule of LOAC is the principle of distinction, which requires parties to distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives.¹

This obligation is codified in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I and further reflected in Article 52(2), which defines military objectives as objects that by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action.² The rule is also reflected in ICRC Customary IHL Rule 1, which requires that attacks be directed only against combatants and military objectives.³

Ukraine’s increasing reliance on drone reconnaissance and video-recorded strikes may in fact support compliance with this principle. Drone footage can assist in verifying target status before engagement and documenting the destruction of lawful military objectives. This aligns with ICRC Customary IHL Rule 16, which requires parties to verify that targets are military objectives before launching an attack.⁴ Nonetheless, could internal incentive systems unintentionally prioritise engagement metrics over careful target assessment?  

Proportionality

LOAC also prohibits attacks expected to cause incidental civilian harm that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. This rule is codified in Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I and reflected in ICRC Customary IHL Rule 14.⁵

Some commentary has suggested that a battlefield scoring system could incentivise aggressive behaviour. However, international humanitarian law does not regulate internal administrative incentives used by armed forces. The legal assessment remains focused on the lawfulness of individual attacks, which must be subject to a proportionality analysis conducted by commanders before engagement. If the attack itself satisfies the proportionality requirement, the existence of an internal performance metric does not alter the legal position.

While lawfulness is assessed on a per-attack basis rather than based on internal metrics, might incentive structures influence commanders’ proportionality assessments, even indirectly?

Precautions in Attack

In addition to distinction and proportionality, parties must take all feasible precautions to minimise civilian harm. These obligations are codified in Article 57 of Additional Protocol I and reflected in customary law, including:

• • ICRC Customary IHL Rule 15 – Precautions in attack

• • ICRC Customary IHL Rule 16 – Verification of targets

• • ICRC Customary IHL Rule 17 – Choice of means and methods of warfare⁶

The integration of drones, digital targeting systems and recorded engagement data may assist commanders in satisfying these obligations by enabling persistent surveillance, improved target identification and detailed post-strike assessments.

NATO Targeting Doctrine

Many of the issues raised by Ukraine’s digital reporting system are already addressed within NATO targeting doctrine. Relevant guidance can be found in:

• • NATO Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.9 – Allied Joint Doctrine for Targeting

• • NATO Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3 – Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations

These doctrinal frameworks emphasise the importance of legal review, command oversight and proportionality analysis throughout the targeting cycle.

Operationally, NATO forces often conceptualise the targeting process through the F2T2EA model (Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess). The final “assess” stage, battle damage assessment, is precisely the type of function that drone-recorded engagement footage can strengthen, potentially improving transparency and operational oversight.

Command Responsibility

Innovative operational tools do not alter the fundamental principle of command responsibility. Commanders remain responsible for ensuring that military operations comply with LOAC and that subordinates follow applicable rules of engagement and targeting procedures.

Digital reporting systems may in fact enhance accountability by generating a documented evidentiary trail of battlefield actions, something historically difficult to obtain in fast-moving conflicts.

Implications for the United Kingdom and Allied Support

Ukraine’s innovations also have relevance for states providing military assistance. In the United Kingdom, LOAC obligations are reflected in domestic law through:

• • The Geneva Conventions Act 1957, which criminalises grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions;

• • The International Criminal Court Act 2001, which provides jurisdiction over war crimes under the Rome Statute.

UK military support to Ukraine must therefore remain consistent with international humanitarian law obligations. At the same time, Ukraine’s battlefield experience provides valuable lessons for allied militaries exploring drone integration, digital targeting systems and rapid procurement models.

Conclusion

Ukraine’s drone-enabled incentive system reflects the broader transformation of warfare in an era increasingly defined by autonomous systems, digital battle management and real-time data analysis.

Despite the technological novelty, the applicable legal framework remains unchanged. Military operations must continue to comply with the core principles of:

• • Distinction – Additional Protocol I, Articles 48 and 52; ICRC Customary IHL Rule 1

• • Proportionality – Additional Protocol I, Article 51(5)(b); ICRC Customary IHL Rule 14

• • Precautions in Attack – Additional Protocol I, Article 57; ICRC Customary IHL Rules 15–17

If implemented with appropriate safeguards and command oversight, digital systems that improve target verification, operational transparency and post-strike assessment may ultimately strengthen compliance with the law of armed conflict.

For legal advisers and defence practitioners, the central issue is therefore not the optics of “gamification,” but ensuring that emerging military technologies are designed with legal compliance embedded into operational decision-making from the outset.

1.